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The Perfect Circle:
Arbitration’s Favors Become
Its Flaws in an Era of
Nationalization and Regulation
Kimberly R. Wagner *
INTRODUCTION
Litigation attorneys are ever alert for the word “lawsuit,” the sound of
which makes any other person cringe. The image of a wood-paneled
courtroom lorded over by a seasoned legal professional, however, has not
always had such a poor reputation; it was once associated with such glorious
ideas as “innocent until proven guilty” and “having a day in court.”
The negative connotation linked to litigation1 stems from several
entrenched and continuing problems, including high costs, the destruction of
business relationships, and the unpredictability of the results, 2 which are
present in both domestic and foreign conflicts. Additional problems arise

* Kimberly R. Wagner is a Juris Doctorate candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law and a
Masters in Dispute Resolution candidate at the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2012. She is
also a Student Articles Editor for the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal.
1. The problems with litigation were evident even as early as the days of Abraham Lincoln,
who observed
the limitations of the legal process: crowded circuit court dockets, with court sessions in
most counties limited to a few days a year; the difficulties of procuring evidence and
witnesses; the unpredictability of local tribunals and juries; and the difficulties of
executing on a debt in the face of a determined, recalcitrant debtor.
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Lincoln’s Lessons for Lawyers, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG., no. 2, Winter 2010,
at 18, 18 [hereinafter Lincoln’s Lessons].
2. Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers
of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 O HIO ST. J. ON D ISP. RESOL. 675, 678 (1998). See also
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. I LL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“Th[e]
dramatic decrease in the trial rate may be attributed, at least in part, to business and public concerns
about the high costs and delays associated with full-blown litigation, its attendant risks and
uncertainties, and its impact on business and personal relationships.”).
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when these transactions span more than one country, forcing parties to
decide on a forum, learn foreign procedures, and pay additional costs. 3 The
impracticality of international litigation was realized after World War II in
the advent of an era characterized by global commercial cooperation. 4 The
three key issues that developed for foreign litigators were: fear of bias for
the domestic party; questionable appealability in foreign fora; and potential
lack of enforceability of a resulting judgment. 5 Consequently, international
parties sought a neutral alternative to alleviate these concerns and provide
more efficient, effective results.6
The goal of this article is to explore the evolution of international
commercial arbitration, highlighting some of its specific aspects that have
brought it under critical evaluation, and to analyze the viability of another
ADR process—mediation—overtaking it in the international arena. Part I
gives a brief background on international arbitration and explains how it has
become so prominent and respected in the global community. It also focuses

3. Sagartz, supra note 3, at 678. See also Bonnie S.C. Klotz, Practitioner’s Workshop:
Practical Aspects of International and Foreign Law Litigation, 79 AM. SOC’Y I NT’ L L. PROC. 328,
329 (1985) (quoting remarks by Eleanor M. Fox, Professor of Law, New York University School of
Law). Ironically, some of the technological advances that make international transactions possible
have contributed to the higher costs. For example, computers and the electronic transmission of
information have led to a rise in “e-discovery,” the gathering of archived information from electronic
databases and networks. Because of the massive amounts of data that is stored, expense and burden
on the parties have significantly increased, prompting a response in 2006 from the Advisory
Committee to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery:
To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875
(2008).
4. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization,
Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More
Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’ L L.J. 359, 362 (2008).
5. Id. There was also the potential for simultaneous litigation in multiple countries regarding
the same issue, which would affect enforceability as well. Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full
Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute
Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2007).
6. For US attorneys, litigation as an international resolution option did not go quietly, and
arbitration was forced to look to Congress for some teeth; consequently, Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act.
The problems Congress faced were . . . twofold: the old common law hostility toward
arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of
arbitration agreements. To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be
enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a
broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was
addressing.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
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on the changes that have been made to the process because of this spotlight,
as civil and common law attorneys compete to control it.
Part II hones in on the criticism that the features of arbitration which
made it popular are now hindering the process, looking to the causes of this
rapid deterioration. The author analyzes three attributed reasons for this
decline: Americanization, nationalization, and overregulation.
Part III concentrates on mediation as the new, up-and-coming possible
replacement for arbitration. This section compares the advantages of
mediation and arbitration and comments on the import of these differences,
concluding that neither is poised to supplant the other, but rather that each
should be valued for its respective purposes and in the appropriate situations.
PART I
A. International Commercial Arbitration:7 The Beginning
The demise of Greek society is attributed to many causes, but one that
has fallen by the wayside is the inability to draft compelling contracts. 8 To
prevent the onslaught of war—the ancient equivalent to litigation—clauses
were included in contracts between city-states which stated the obligation to
seek an alternative remedy for any disputes.9 One example is the Pease of
Nicias between Sparta and Athens, which required that “if there should arise
a difference between them they will remit its solution to a procedure
according to a method upon which they will come to an agreement.” 10 Any
first-year contracts student, however, could identify the vague, nonspecific
language as the literally fatal flaw; once an issue develops between parties, it
is unlikely that they will agree to anything, much less a specific method of
dispute resolution. Thus, the establishment of a solution before the problem
arises is the more prudent course. The outcome of this early recorded
7. “Arbitration is customarily defined as ‘a simple proceeding voluntarily chosen by parties
who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of their own mutual selection, whose decision,
based on the merits of the case, they agree in advance to accept as final and binding.’” Maureen A.
Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88
MINN. L. REV. 449, 452 (2004) (quoting MARLIN M. VOLZ & EDWARD P. GOGGIN, ELKOURI &
ELKOURI: HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (5th ed. 1997).).
8. William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 42 (1996).
9. Id. at 41.
10. Id.
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arbitration attempt was six short years of peace before the arrangement was
broken.11
Perhaps realizing the potentially catastrophic effect of a poorly-written
agreement, the English took a more successful stab at an alternative to
litigation in the thirteenth century with their establishment of private
tribunals to govern commercial claims, 12 beginning the first western dispute
resolution systems. Following this cue, the Jay Treaty, created in 1794,
contained a commission for similar tribunals to allow British creditors to
arbitrate claims against nationals of the United States.13 Arbitration was
finally recognized as a legitimate system with the opening of the
International Court of Arbitration, operated by the International Chamber of
Commerce, in 1923.14 Its value was established in the 1950s 15 when
international litigation proved to be insufficient for the newly globalized
economy,16 and the practice gained worldwide notoriety with the
summoning of the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. 17 The “New York Convention,”18 as the
conference is fondly called, made unprecedented headway with the melding
of foreign legal systems by holding party states responsible for enforcing
arbitral awards rendered in other countries 19 and for upholding forum
selection clauses,20 a respect that is not even afforded to court judgments. 21

11. Id. at 42.
12. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1343.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1343-44. “When crafting arbitration agreements in the early to mid-20th century,
commercial parties and their respective counsel focused on two main issues: (1) the neutrality of the
arbitration seat and (2) the seat’s local laws affecting arbitral proceedings.” Jacobs & Paulson, supra
note 5, at 366.
15. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1344.
16. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 362.
17. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1344.
18. The New York Convention was drafted based on the Geneva Convention of 1927, “which
was the primary arbitration convention in force at that time.” Brette L. Steele, Enforcing
International Commercial Mediation Agreements as Arbitral Awards Under the New York
Convention, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1385, 1392 (2007). Under its terms, this early agreement required
that a party seeking enforcement of an arbitral award had the burden of proving the finality and
viability of the award. Id. The New York Convention revolutionized this harsh requirement to open
the doors to international favor of arbitration, “plac[ing] the burden of proving these exceptions on
the party seeking to block enforcement, instead of the party defending enforcement. This marked
shift in presumption illustrates and enhances a strong policy towards recognizing and enforcing
arbitration awards.” Id. at 1393.
19. As sovereign entities, states generally expect deference to their choice of domestic
arbitration laws. However,
[s]tates which recognise international arbitration as a valid method of resolving
commercial and other disputes are usually ready to give their assistance to the arbitral
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Since the New York Convention, 146 countries have agreed to uphold
the newfound sanctity of arbitration. 22 Many of these nations have initiated
private arbitration legislation to preserve the process domestically and
prevent court interference with the implementation and outcomes of
contractual arbitration clauses. 23 As a result, “arbitration has become . . .
preferred over judicial methods of dispute resolution because the parties
have considerable freedom and flexibility with regard to choice of
arbitrators, location of arbitration, procedural rules for the arbitration, and
the substantive law that will govern the relationship and rights of the
parties.”24 Parties look to arbitration for the perceived benefits of “cost
savings, shorter resolution times, a more satisfactory process, expert
decision makers, privacy and confidentiality, and relative finality.” 25 This
dispute resolution technique, however, is increasingly coming under fire for
the same insufficiencies it was designed to solve. 26

process. . . . In return, it is to be expected that they will seek to exercise some control
over the arbitral process. Such control is usually exercised on a territorial basis-first, over
arbitrations conducted in the territory of the State concerned, and secondly, over awards
brought into the territory of the State concerned for the purpose of recognition and
enforcement.
NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND H UNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 69 (5th ed.
2009).
20. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363.
21. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1345. See also Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration
Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (2010) (“[The New York
Convention] has been an enormously successful international agreement . . . but it requires countries
to do more for arbitrations than for foreign court judgments. The New York Convention is the
engine that makes international arbitration go.” (quoting Mark W. Friedman, a partner in the New
York City office of Debevoise & Plimpton)).
22. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363; Cf. New York Convention Countries, NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries
(last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
23. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363.
24. Id. (quoting Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration,
26 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512 (1988)).
25. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 4.
26. Id. at 5 (“[T]he literature frequently focuses on various perceived shortcomings, including
unqualified arbitrators, uneven administration, difficulties with arbitrator compromise, and limited
appeal. There are, moreover, frequent complaints regarding delay and high cost.”).
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B. Evolution of Arbitration Procedures
Since its more modern beginnings, the benefits of arbitration have been
tailored to apply to many situations, which has resulted in a change of the
general process itself as it is administered in all cases.27 Two of the key
areas which have been affected are discovery and witness examination, 28
which ultimately reflect the different and changing styles of American and
foreign attorneys.
Modern international commercial arbitration has its roots in Western
Europe, primarily France and Switzerland, 29 though its history comes from
several parts of the Western World. Now, as an internationally renowned
system, arbitration is utilized and adopted by numerous legal styles and
traditions.30 Because of these differences, however, there has been a residual
clash between civil law practiced by the “Continent,” or continental Europe,
and common law as championed by the United States and the United
Kingdom31 since the practice was expanded globally.32 The term of art for
this clash has been dubbed “Americanization,” 33 because as international
arbitration was “originally a European/civil law phenomenon,” 34 any
changes made are associated with America or common law. 35

27. Id. at 11.
28. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363-67.
29. Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,” or
Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON D ISP. RESOL. 35, 45 (2003).
30. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363.
31. Id. at 1362.
32. Helmer, supra note 30, at 35.
[A]n ‘academic confrontation . . . between those trained in the Anglo-Saxon legal
profession and those having a Roman law orientation’ continues to produce debates in
scholarly writings and at conferences as to how international commercial arbitrations are
to be conducted and what is the role of Anglo-American lawyers in the development of
international arbitration in general.
Id.
33. Id. The word was supposedly coined by Stephen Bond, then Secretary General of the
International Court of Arbitration, established by the International Chamber of Commerce. Id.
34. Id. at 36.
35. Depending on the legal perspective of the discussion of “Americanization,” the speaker
may describe the phenomenon in one of two ways. First, it could mean “converting European
arbitrators to the ‘English language and to the usages of Anglo-Americans . . ., enlarg[ing] the club
[of European arbitrators] and . . . rationaliz[ing] the practice of arbitration such that it could become
offshore-U.S.-style-litigation.’” To the opposition, however, it would take on the meaning that
“‘Americanization’ or an ‘American approach’ . . . is often a code word for an unbridled and
ungentlemanly aggressivity [sic] and excess in arbitration. It can involve a strategy of ‘total
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1. Impact of Internationalization on Discovery
Discovery is one of the main areas that has been affected by common
law presence in the world of arbitration. 36 Civil law discovery, called
“disclosure,” is a process in which the attorneys from each side simply
present to the court the main documents on which their cases are based.37
Europe finds this simplicity to be a point of pride because it makes
adjudication faster, cheaper, and more confidential. 38 With the increasing
involvement of American attorneys, however, representing both American
and foreign clients in the international arena,39 the civil law tradition has
been giving way to “mass discovery routines of American-style litigation”40
because of the perception that disclosure does not allow for a full finding of
the facts relevant to the case.41

warfare,’ the excesses of U.S.-style discovery, and distended briefs and document submissions.” Id.
at 35-36.
36. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON D ISP. RESOL. 69, 80-81 (2003) (“According to a Chambers Global publication on the ‘World’s
Leading Lawyers,’ the trend in the French legal market has been the concurrent decline of the
traditional Franco-French firm, with its emphasis on individual superstars, and the rise of the AngloAmerican firm, with its emphasis on tight organizational structure and teamwork. Their survey
identifies seven of the top eight leading arbitration practices in France to be in Anglo-American law
firms.”).
40. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363. Compared to the narrow civil law requirement to
disclose only the documents that are key to the case, the common law discovery rules, though still
limited to an extent, appear to be quite broad.
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim
or defense–including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Note the difference between the burdens of the rules; civil law puts the
burden of disclosure solely on the party in possession of the evidence, while common law parties
have much freer rein to not only request crucial evidence, but any evidence that may or may not lead
to crucial evidence.
41. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363.
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[I]n recognizing its benefits, many civil lawyers and arbitrators have begun to accept
limited means of discovery in international commercial arbitration. In doing so, limited
discovery blends the common law approach, which seeks the production of categories of
relevant documents, and individual documents, with the civil law approach, which
42
demands that the documents be identified with reasonable specificity.

Though this compromise was regarding procedure, which is usually not
codified to afford the parties greater flexibility in conducting their
arbitrations,43 the International Bar Association adopted a set of model rules
based on this formula which could be incorporated into a contractual
arbitration agreement. 44
Despite the more structured approach that institutional rules have been
developing for discovery to streamline the process, many arbitrators tend “to
be very liberal in the admission of evidence.” 45 “[A]rbitrators tend to be
reluctant to refuse admittance to evidence, and . . . tend to go along so no
one can say that justice has not been served–so the award will be rendered
more bulletproof.”46 Though it is rare for a court to overturn arbitrators for
failure to admit evidence because of the wide deference given to their
decisions, arbitrators still have an interest in the display of judiciousness
regardless of financial or temporal expense to the arbitrating parties. 47
While this may be an inherent frustration to some parties, others recognize
the caution as a necessary aspect of a thorough, satisfactory arbitration. 48 It
is important, therefore, in assessing the costs and benefits of arbitration to
consider the unique situation of each party and to recognize that a costly
inconvenience for some parties may be worth the price.49
2. Impact of Internationalization on Witness Examination
The other key difference between civil and common law practices lies
with the examination of witnesses. 50 Because international commercial
arbitration turns primarily on the interpretation of business contracts,

42. Id. at 1364.
43. Helmer, supra note 30, at 55.
44. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1364-65.
45. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 15.
46. Id. (quoting Telephone Interview by Thomas J. Stipanowich with David McLean,
Managing Partner, New Jersey Office, Latham &Watkins LLP (Oct. 7, 2008)).
47. Interview with Thomas J. Stipanowich, William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution
and Professor of Law at Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law, in Malibu, Cal. (Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter
Stipanowich Interview].
48. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,”
7 DEPAUL BUS . & COM. LAW J. 384, 385-86 (2009).
49. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
50. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363.
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arbitrators tend to focus more on written documents than oral testimony. 51
Civil law traditionally also tends to favor written over oral testimony, and
thus, the preference was originally adopted in the development of
international arbitration. 52 This is not to say, though, that common law
procedure did not have an impact. “Attorneys with civil law backgrounds
have come to recognize that examining witnesses, especially through crossexamination, has many benefits.”53 This realization, like that of the benefits
of the discovery process, is not codified in any rules to regulate proceedings
in the interest of maintaining the flexibility of arbitration, but the arbitrators
are given the discretion to limit the scope of examination and crossexamination.54 They also tend to participate more heavily in the crossexamination process than a typical common law judge to ensure that the
information they receive is complete and accurate. 55 To further ensure that
the memorialized record is as useful as possible, condensed summaries of
witness testimony are prepared to “promote certainty and common
understanding in the witnesses’ testimony by reconciling inconsistencies and
adding to the quality of the arbitrator’s decision-making.” 56
C. Common Law Infiltration Into Civil Law Arbitration
“Americanization” is a topic that has been much discussed for over a
decade as the United States has become a more looming presence in
international commercial arbitration after the ratification of the New York
Convention in 1970. 57 Most notable is the effect that the presence of
American attorneys on the international scene has had on procedure, as
noted by the differences in discovery and examination of witnesses; “the
continuing flow of American newcomers” brings trial tactics that are
familiar to common law practitioners 58 but overly aggressive to civil

51. Id. at 1366.
52. Id. at 1362.
53. Id. at 1366.
54. Id. at 1367.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Helmer, supra note 30, at 43.
58. Id. at 46. See also Alford, supra note 40, at 83 (“Whether the skills are transferable or
successful in international arbitration is not the point. With the overwhelming influence of
American law firms on the global scene, the fact that these tactics are tried is altering the atmosphere
of international commercial arbitration.”).
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practitioners.59 To understand the course of the changes that American law
is encouraging in international commercial arbitration, it is important to
trace why there are differences between civil and common law, 60 and from
where they stem. The underlying justification for legal procedures and
practices appears to generally flow from the social ethics on which they are
based. Thus, a comparison of the doctrinal ethics of civil and common law
should shed some light on the foundation for each system’s procedures and
be illustrative of where their principles diverge.
1. Civil vs. Common Law Ethics
American law students are indoctrinated with the ethical model standard
of “zealous advocacy,” which is touted as the quintessential behavior for a
practicing attorney. 61 With this high bar in mind, aspiring young graduates
apply this requirement to every aspect of legal practice, and to perform any
lesser standard reeks of potential malpractice allegations.62 As a result of
this mantra, “[c]ommon law lawyers . . . often[ ]demonstrate[ ] greater
energy and training in obtaining, analyzing[,] and arguing the facts on which
most arbitrations are won or lost.” 63 Considering this assessment by a Swiss
attorney, it seems to be no mystery why European practitioners would be
resentful of the strong litigation techniques exemplified by American
lawyers that so often tip the outcome of a case in their favor.64
By contrast, civil law systems have no such archetypal standard to
which their attorneys feel morally and professionally bound. 65 “[T]he rules
of professional conduct ‘are handed down from generation to generation as
some kind of “oral law,” uncodified and restricted to prohibitions of the
obvious conflicts of interest.’”66 Some jurisdictions do not have set
guidelines at all, but rather rely on volunteer organizations to develop a code
for the noble-minded that has only force of conscience. 67 Far from

59. Helmer, supra note 30, at 35-36.
60. Id. at 36-37 (“The whole debate of Americanization of international commercial
arbitration springs from what has been called the ‘Common Law-Civil Law Divide.’”).
61. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 11.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Helmer, supra note 30, at 47 (quoting Nicolas C. Ulmer, A Comment on “The
‘Americanization’ of International Arbitration?,” 16 MEALEY’S I NT’ L ARB. REP. 24, 24 (2001)).
64. Helmer, supra note 30, at 47.
65. See Mary C. Daly, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About the Civil Law System, 1998
PROF . LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 37, 46 (1998).
66. Id.
67. Id. See Rona R. Mears, Ethics and Due Diligence: A Lawyer’s Perspective on Doing
Business with Mexico, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 605, 609-11 (1991).
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lamenting the lack of ethical guidance, British practitioners, who follow the
same undefined principles as civil law attorneys, “th[ink] it quaint that
American lawyers fe[el] in need of legal rules for their governance, but they
recall[ ] that Americans seem[ ] to need legal rules for everything.” 68
While the import of these ethical differences may not be immediately
apparent, it does explain the impetus behind the techniques utilized by
common and civil law practitioners. Common law practitioners are more
likely to feel professionally obligated to engage in litigious techniques that
meet the standard of “zealous advocacy,” even in the context of arbitration,
because they are compelled to do so on behalf of their clients. 69 Civil law
practitioners, on the other hand, have the freedom to adapt their techniques
to what they believe is appropriate for the situation as there is no firm
standard of performance to which they will be held accountable. 70 This
conclusion suggests that the aggression of American law that is so loathed
by civil law practitioners is unlikely to subside unless the ethical standards
ingrained in the minds of American law students are amended to provide for
differences between litigious and dispute resolution situations. 71

68. Daly, supra note 66, at 46 n.29.
69. See Stipanowich Interview, supra note 47. It is important to keep in mind that the ethical
obligations of attorneys in an arbitration are not equated to the rules of litigation; zealous advocacy
does not require the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure scope of discovery to be applied to the
resolution of every dispute. Id. Rather, a client may want or be willing to have less discovery, in
which case zealous advocacy would mean finding the fastest and cheapest solution. Id. After all, in
the words of William Gladstone, “justice delayed is justice denied.” Id. Discovery as practiced in
litigation has essentially been priced out of the market to the point of impracticality and does not
need to be brought to arbitration for a lawyer to meet the standard of ethics. Id. See also THE
COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS , PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS , COST-EFFECTIVE
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS &
ARBITRATION PROVIDER I NSTITUTIONS 26 (Thomas J. Stipanowich ed., 2010) [hereinafter
PROTOCOLS ].
70. See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. I NT’L L. 53, 99-100 (2005) [hereinafter Regulating
Arbitrators].
[C]ivilian attorneys are assigned an obligation to be ‘independent’ from their clients. In
this role, civilian attorneys do not present their clients’ positions in their strongest, most
uncompromising form . . . . Instead, they mediate their strongest position, presenting a
pre-screened and more restrained view of their clients’ cases to the inquisitorial judge.
Id. Accordingly, civil law judges do not interpret the applicable codes and statutes, but rather simply
apply the law for the correct outcome. Id. at 100.
71. Because of the increasing formalities associated with arbitration and its supposed likeness
to litigation,
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2. Ethical Differences Applied to Arbitration
Though arbitrators are touted essentially as neutral magistrates in the
disputes over which they preside, it would be foolish to pretend that they are
immune to the influences of their national countries. 72 While this may not
be as crucial with the application of procedural rules such as scope of
discovery and format of examination, ethical considerations pervade into
every aspect of any legal proceeding. 73 However, in order to unify the
ethical values of international arbitrators, any standards that are developed
“must be linked to the values of the international arbitration system and the
procedures that reflect those values.”74 Because international arbitration is
“the only viable means for resolving international business disputes,” the
necessary inclination toward increased predictability and accountability must
be achieved, but only as governed by a set of ethical standards to which
arbitrators can be held accountable. 75

[t]he zealous advocate who jealously guards (and does not share) information, who does
not reveal adverse facts (and in some cases, adverse law) to the other side, who seeks to
maximize gain for his client, may be successful in arbitrations and some forms of minitrials and summary jury trials.
However, the zealous advocate will likely prove a failure in mediation, where creativity,
focus on the opposing sides’ interests, and a broadening, not narrowing of issues, may be
more valued skills.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the
Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 427 (1997).
72. See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct
for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 376 (2002) (“In the absence of articulated
norms and express enforcement mechanisms, arbitrators likely assess the conduct of attorneys based
on private–and untested–standards informed by the arbitrators’ legal and cultural backgrounds.”).
Therefore, it is impractical to expect ethical norms to “effectively be resolved on an ad hoc basis
during proceedings.” Id. at 377.
73. The different roles that the various legal systems contemplate for attorneys
reflect the larger cultural values of the societies that produce them. . . . [T]he greater
authority of civil law judges reflects . . . a greater acceptance of authority and less
tolerance for uncertainty. . . . [T]he expanded control of parties in U.S. proceedings, and
the consequent role of the U.S. attorney as strategist and lobbyist, are said to be linked to
the American commitment to individualism and an exaltation of due process over
efficiency and even fact-finding accuracy. Thus, while legal ethics are often regarded as
universal by virtue of their intimate relationship to moral philosophy, they are in fact
vitally linked to the cultural values of the systems that produced them.
Id. at 394.
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id. at 422.
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Arbitrators are equated to judges because of the significant control that
they have over parties in contractual, statutory, and other legal capacities 76
despite the fact that there are no formal minimum qualifications, including
the possession of legal training. 77 Regardless of this questionable disparity,
there is little that parties can do legally in the event of arbitrator misconduct
because of the confidentiality78 of the process.79 Additionally, “arbitration
associations ‘have an economic disincentive to enforcing their codes of
ethics. There is an inherent conflict of interest for arbitration associations:
they must enforce codes of ethics enough to preserve the good name of
arbitration, but not so much that they generate unwanted publicity and
lawsuits.’”80 This financially-motivated conundrum is mirrored for the
arbitrator as well, who must determine whether there is an ethical need to
disclose conflicts of interests81 which may result in dismissal from the case.82
76. Weston, supra note 8, at 452. Arbitrators even have the inherent power to determine their
own jurisdiction under the doctrine of competence. N IGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 20, at 347.
The decision made regarding this authority is given wide deference and only results in a reversal “in
very unusual circumstances.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). See
also PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003) (“questions whether [the
contractual provisions] render the parties’ agreements unenforceable and whether it is for courts or
arbitrators to decide enforceability . . . the proper course is to compel arbitration.”).
77. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 56.
78. Sometimes the process can be too confidential when the parties request, but do not receive,
an explanation for the award.
An arbitrator should be free to decide the dispute before him without fear that he will
have to explain the basis for his decision, and how he arrived at it, at some later date. If
the parties to an arbitration agreement want to know the arbitrator’s reasoning, they may
request that he include it in his award . . . . Once an arbitrator issues an award, however,
his role is complete and, like a judge or jury, he may not be required to answer questions
about why he reached a particular result.
Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 68 (2nd Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds). What the
court does not mention is that unlike a judge or jury, an arbitrator is hired by the parties, and it would
seem that it would be within their rights to demand his full services for their payment, at least to the
extent of a written opinion.
79. Weston, supra note 8, at 463-64. Because of the confidential aspect of arbitration, there
are also “no guarantees of due process, discovery, appeal, or other protections that are available in
the judicial system.” Id.
80. Id. at 469.
81. Interestingly, one of the biggest key differences between civil and common law lies with
conflicts of interest.
American attorneys brought . . . practices that profoundly affect arbitrator conduct, such
as a compulsively persnickety approach to conflicts-of-interest. . . . [T]he reality and
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Thus, it has been firmly established that it is necessary to have a system
of ethics to which international arbitrators would be obligated. 83 The
process of creating such a system appears to be rather simple; “relatively
few direct conflicts appear to exist among national codes of professional
conduct.” 84 While the biggest differences appear in the approaches to ethics
in civil and common law jurisdictions, 85 even these are deemed to be
perception of U.S. conflict-of-interest standards contrast sharply with European standards
and practices, which permit the same and other close relationships to be legitimately
withheld.
Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 63. In his article, Alan Rau suggests that the current lack
of set ethical obligations leans too far toward the civil law approach:
[A]ll of the arbitrators on international panels are expected to be both impartial and
independent of the party appointing them. They may, however—without violating in any
way this theoretical obligation—quite acceptably share the nationality, or political or
economic philosophy, or “legal culture” of the nominating party—and may therefore be
supposed from the very beginning to be “sympathetic” to that party’s contentions or
“favorably disposed” to its position.
Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’ L L. J.
449, 459 (2005). This assessment, however, is insultingly narrow-minded in its assumption that
simple commonality of ideology will lead to discriminatory behavior. While ADR was once
practiced with the attitude that “anyone who would engage in ADR must of necessity be a moral,
good, creative, and of course, ethical person,” the pendulum does not need to swing so far the other
direction that any familiarity with a party’s background will warrant disqualification. MenkelMeadow, supra note 71, at 408.
82. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 71-72.
83. See Cyrus Benson, Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in
International Arbitration, 3 DISP. RESOL. I NT’L 78, 78-79 (2009). A failure to develop a universal
code of arbitral ethics
can easily breed procedural unfairness in the particular case, and it matters generally
because it attacks the integrity of the system of international arbitration. [Without
practical guidance for counsel,] [t]he system of self-policing may become impossible and
there may be a gradual deterioration in the standards of legal professional conduct. The
international arbitral process would then be brought into disrepute and, once its good
reputation was lost, it could take decades to rebuild confidence.
Id. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 418 (“ADR now needs ‘ethics’ or standards in part
because of its successes—it is being challenged from within as well as without.”).
84. Benson, supra note 83, at 82.
85. Id.
Most common law codes of professional conduct are far more detailed in identifying
conduct to be regulated than their civil law counterparts, where lawyer conduct is
governed by general standards of integrity and good faith. Further, common law systems
of ethics incorporate a lawyer’s duty to the tribunal or court, in addition to that owed to
the client. This duty is largely unrecognised in civil law systems.

172

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/5

14

Wagner: The Perfect Circle: Arbitration's Favors Become Its Flaws in an E

[Vol. 12: 159, 2012]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

unlikely to affect the arbitrators “in aspects that are most relevant to their
ethical obligations.”86 Therefore, the most widely-advocated method for
cultivating a system of international arbitration ethical standards is to specify
broad standards – “based on adherence to ethical, moral, and ‘good’ nonadversary principles” – that are supplemented by the principles of common
law which guide ethical legal processes. 87
From these standards, several codes could be developed which parties
would be able to adopt and adapt to their situations in the true spirit of
arbitration.88 Theoretically, the greater discretion of the parties in governing
the conduct of the arbitrators would warrant greater involvement by the
institutions, which would hopefully increase the transparency of how the
institutions are run and correct the market’s perception of them. 89 While this
increased transparency would not necessarily guarantee more ethical
arbitrators or outcomes, it could enhance the legitimacy of institutional
arbitration, which depends on the appearance of impartiality on the part of
the neutrals.90 Thus, the harmonization of civil and common law traditions
in procedural arbitral practices should be applied to the ethical standards as
well to create a reliable framework to which arbitrators would be held
accountable.
PART II
A. Arbitration’s Full Circle
Tracing the path of the evolution of arbitration and investigating the
influences behind its course are vital to determine where the process is likely

Id.
86. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 109.
87. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 451. For an example of such a set of standards, see
Benson, supra note 83, at 88-94.
88. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 111. While parties already have the flexibility to
create and implement codes of ethics on arbitrators in their agreements to arbitrate, the idea would
be to give extra incentive to do so by making available templates to incorporate. Id. at 112. Though
not discussed by the author, the effectiveness of this new system would rely on the responsibility of
the parties’ attorneys in choosing the applicable code—a level of responsibility that has not always
been demonstrated in the world of international arbitration.
89. Id. at 111-12.
90. Id. at 118-20.
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to go and what its fate may be. When it was widely introduced as a viable
alternative to litigation in the early 1900s, advocates lauded arbitration’s key
characteristics—efficiency,91 lower expense, and finality92—as a perfect
escape. Their tune soon changed however to denounce the process for the
same shortcomings from which litigation suffered: “‘judicializ[ation],’
formal[ity], cost[ ], and time-consum[ption].”93 If this condemning view is
accurate, arbitration may be subject to the same backseat position to which it
assigned litigation when it rose to the international spotlight as an effective
dispute resolution alternative.
Arbitration was implemented globally with little critique for the first
century of its prominence; numerous institutions were established to
promote its powers, many of which saw significant growth. 94 There is no
question of its success, and at one time, as much as ninety percent of
international commercial transactions contained arbitration clauses. 95
Arbitration is accepted as an indispensable alternative to litigation and is still
much preferred in the international arena despite some concerns about its
rules and prominent fora; its value is particularly known to those who have
experienced it.96 However, disapproval of arbitration techniques is now
rampant, citing several causes including heavy American influence,
nationalization, and overregulation.
1. American Litigation: Bettering International Commercial
Arbitration?
The most blatant attempt to blame American influence for the
deterioration of arbitration comes from foreign litigators associating it with
“judicialization.”97 American attorneys are often charged with trying to
make arbitration procedures mirror those of the U.S. court system “in order
to increase its predictability, reliability, and equity.”98 The result however is

91. Though the Federal Arbitration Act came long after the introduction of arbitration, it has
actually begun to undermine the efficiency of the process it was designed to promote. Dean Witters
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which the parties had entered, and that concern
requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation
. . . .”).
92. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 8.
93. Id.
94. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1351-52.
95. Id. at 1342-43.
96. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
97. Helmer, supra note 30, at 36.
98. Id.
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said to be that those procedural changes convert arbitration into U.S.-style
The implication that Americans becoming involved in
litigation.99
international commercial arbitration is the sole cause of its downfall seems
to be a bit far-fetched. For instance, despite the fact that the process began
in Western Europe, the application of American procedures in stages such as
discovery and witness examination has had a lasting impact on arbitration
itself.100 Simply because international commercial arbitration is no longer
exclusively governed by civil law does not mean that it will automatically
suffer the same fate as the system—American litigation—which has
influenced it. Regardless of the truth of this conclusion, civil law systems
still insist on circumventing the influence of American techniques, namely
by exercising greater control over the substantive arbitral process through
increasingly detailed contract clauses. 101
Further, a certain amount of American influence in almost any industry
should be expected per past global trends. 102 One author has cited as many
as nine key trends initiated by contact with American litigation styles, none
99. Id.
100. See supra nn. 41 & 52 (indicating the willingness of civil law attorneys to incorporate
American methods of discovery and examination into arbitration procedures).
101. Rau, supra note 81, at 453-54.
In substantial transactions one is increasingly seeing a use of custom-tailored arbitration
clauses—often intended to diminish the finality of awards or to increase formality in
arbitral procedure. This is surely but one manifestation of what is often described and
decried as the “judicialization” or “legalization” or arbitration . . . . The increased
involvement . . . of American litigators in transnational arbitration also undoubtedly plays
a role; the habits—and perceived duties—of such litigators may, it is said, lead them “to
push to enlarge the limited means of appeal and therefore expand the control of the courts
over private justice.”
Id.
102. Alford, supra note 40, at 87-88. Alford draws an analogy to the film industry to imply that
American involvement in up-and-coming ideas is inevitable:
[C]inema was born in Paris on December 28, 1895 . . . . Much of the early history of film
has its roots in Europe rather than the United States. The greatest films were German, the
best editing techniques were Russian, and much of the best equipment was developed in
France. But it was the establishment in the 1920s of major Hollywood motion picture
studios . . . that led to the golden age of Hollywood. Those studios created an economic
juggernaut that assimilated the best and the brightest artists and directors from Europe . . .
. Today we all know that the United States is the dominant force in film.
Id. And so the same can be true for America’s influence in international commercial arbitration.
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of which can take credit for arbitration’s potentially deteriorating success.103
Rather, a different global trend triggered by the increasingly interconnected
economies of various nations should be examined – nationalization.104
2. The Effects of the Natural Nationalization Process
Nationalization “is part of a privatization-nationalization cycle found in
many places throughout the world.”105 It is instigated by a host of effects,
including “political ideology, foreign relations, decapitalization of the host
country, a desire for increased control and independence, market
domination, culture, and even religion.”106
The rise of government control over once-private industries began with
the growth of fossil fuel use to produce energy; the spike in demand
necessitated more resources to meet these quotas, which could only be
supplied by the government. 107 At first, the supplying countries only
required larger shares of the profits of oil-producing companies, but it was
simply a matter of time before the governments “increase[d] their roles in
the management of the oil companies’ ventures.”108 Because the countries
themselves now owned such lucrative international industries, any disputes
that arose came between their governments.109
Though relations between countries have come a long way since the
Pease of Nicias,110 resolving international disputes is still far from perfect.
With politics involved with international commercial issues, the number of
claims has skyrocketed, as has the amount of money associated with them111
as the heads of states are perceived to be easier targets, and are connected
with far more potential parties through various contractual obligations and
bilateral investment treaties.112 While some countries have responded more
aggressively than others,113 challenging the validity of their own contracts to
103. Alford, supra note 40. Alford lists the following influences: rise of Anglo-American law
firms, legal training, style, discovery, choice of law, venue, published precedent, language, and
institutional personnel. Id.
104. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 375.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 375-76.
108. Id. at 376.
109. Id. at 381-85.
110. Slate, supra note 9, at 41-42.
111. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 384.
112. Id.
113. Argentina was inundated with requests for arbitration after its 2001 economic crisis “that
led to its defaulting on foreign debt and the devaluation of the peso.” Id.
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prevent liability, there is no question that the myriad of defense strategies
such as expropriation and breach of contract will result in arbitration
becoming “more complicated, more costly, and less efficient.”114 If this
assertion sounds familiar, it is; it is the same claim that scholars have made
about the effect of Americanization on arbitration. 115
There are two main procedural solutions that have been proposed by
those who express concern with this trend: better delineation of legal
principles that could lead to preliminary determinations; and more efficient
techniques for discovery and disclosure tactics. 116 First, with the flood of
claims that have been brought against the governments of countries who
have nationalized prominent producers of crucial resources, it is highly
unlikely that they are all meritorious. 117 American litigation disposes of
frivolous claims through summary judgments and other preliminary
procedures; however, “[o]ne disadvantage of international arbitration is that
issues that may be dispositive of a case and appropriate for a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment in court litigation may often be considered by
arbitrators only after a full evidentiary hearing on all of the issues.”118
Recognizing this detriment, the suggested solution has been to draft
arbitration clauses to include specific language to provide for these
determinations.119 Practically speaking, it would also be prudent for arbitral

Argentina responded with a multi-layer legal defense strategy: it challenged [the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes]’s jurisdiction to hear the
disputes and argued that bilateral treaties do not supersede Argentina’s constitution,
which requires claims to be brought before Argentine courts; it proceeded to defend the
claims on their merits and asserted the doctrine of sovereign rights and the national
emergency clause in its [bilateral investment treaties] to justify its monetary policies; it
scrutinized the compliance with contractual obligations by each contractor since the
beginning of the contract and threatened termination; it challenged the validity and
enforceability of awards, including expanded review by the Federal Supreme Court of
Argentina.
Id. Though Argentina’s tactics are geared toward economic and global political survival, their
effectiveness could lead to similar defenses in other countries. This is harmful because it could draw
out the timing and cost of arbitration, particularly with the increase of claims against the
governments of the countries involved.
114. Id. at 385.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 386.
117. Id. at 384.
118. Id. at 397.
119. Id. at 398.
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institutions to consider such changes to their procedures to encourage the
practice more widely in contracts that employ their rules. 120
Second, the process of arbitral discovery has fallen victim to the
cumbersome use of expert witnesses, who may or may not contribute any
meaningful information to the cases. 121 Even the most contributive experts
impose extra costs and time on the parties to the conflict, and because of
their lack of neutrality, detract from the spirit of the arbitration process.122
Because education of the arbitrators on the central issues of the case is
necessary, it not practical to eliminate the role of experts entirely; rather, the
proposed remedy has been to increase the transparency of their technical
conclusions, and to request that they simply submit their findings with the
result to enhance the efficiency of the examination and cross-examination
stage.123
3. Overregulation: Taking Too Much Control from the Parties
Finally, while arbitration is often paraded as a model procedure that
maintains flexibility of process124 and provides a solution, the increase in
arbitral institution regulation is beginning to defeat that assertion. The clash
between the origins of international commercial arbitration in civil law and
the rising influence of American and British common law125 has necessitated

120. Currently, the International Bar Association only has a vague reference to preliminary
rulings on the issues in its Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration:
“[E]ach Arbitral Tribunal is encouraged to identify to the Parties, as soon as it considers it to be
appropriate, the issues that it may regard as relevant to the outcome of the case, including issues
where a preliminary determination may be appropriate.” Id. at 397 (quoting IBA Rules on the
Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration pmbl. 3 (1999)).
121. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 398.
122. Id. at 399. American litigation has come to refer fondly to this head butt of professional,
qualified witnesses as “battle of the experts,” which has led to significant debate over who exactly
falls within the description of “expert” and when their testimony is considered valid.
123. Id. “[A]dditional mandatory disclosures would promote greater neutrality, transparency,
and objectivity . . . .” Id.
Those additional mandatory disclosures, which would be established early in the
arbitration process, should include: the expert’s entire file including draft reports,
correspondence, data, documents, and notes used in the evaluation of the issues within his
or her expertise; a list of proceedings and cases in which the expert has provided
testimony in the previous five years; and if the expert’s work includes any sampling or
testing, then the expert and party must take duplicative samples and timely provide them
to the opposing party and submit the results of all samples and tests.
Id.
124. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 1.
125. See supra note 60.
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a litany of rules and treaties to ensure that arbitration maintains its
effectiveness.126 In order for the rules themselves to maintain neutrality,
they do not reflect the legal customs or systems of the countries that provide
them, ideally to afford the greatest possible flexibility for arbitrators.127
While this is helpful in conducting the actual arbitration, the disparities
amongst the various possibilities have created problems in enforcing the
awards and how each country is to treat the credibility of the arbitration
award.128 The goal of the New York Convention was to address these
problems, but differences in the interpretation of the Convention language
have lessened the effect of this treaty.129
While the purpose of the New York Convention was to ensure the
finality of arbitral awards and protect them from the uncertainty of judicial
review, this end is ironically contrary to the ultimate idea of arbitration as a
flexible institution. Not every party that embarks on alternate dispute
resolution is seeking finality or an absolute avoidance of the courtroom. 130
Some users of arbitration wish to retain the option of a second opinion in the
event that they feel the outcome is unfair, but have no grounds on which to
overturn it; in this case, they would incorporate a judicial review
provision.131 This tool allows parties to explore the flexibility of dictating
the arbitration proceedings through the language of their contract without
committing to the finality that is usually so integral to the process. 132

126. See Stromberg, supra note 6, 1352-58. There are several global arbitral institutions that
have developed model sets of rules for parties to incorporate into arbitration clauses, including:
International Chamber of Commerce, American Arbitration Association, London Court of
International Arbitration, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, and
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre. Id.
127. Helmer, supra note 30, at 55.
128. Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005 J.
DISP. RESOL. 323, 343 (2005).
129. Id.
Procedures are left to national arbitration laws, and this problem could be remedied by
uniform procedural rules of enforcement. There is also a need for consistency among
nations in the application and interpretation of the convention. . . . Some nations such as
Canada do not consider the convention as controlling over its own laws.
Id.
130. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
131. Id. See also Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 17-18.
132. See Cable Connections, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1355 (2008). The
California Supreme Court recently confirmed that parties can agree to wider judicial review of an
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However, the stringent requirement of the New York Convention to
recognize arbitration awards without including the courts 133 threatens to
impede on this option.134
An additional pitfall for the suggestion of uniform, effective arbitration
rules comes from the fact that the arbitrator’s authority is dictated by the
scope of the contractual language, 135 allowing parties to create their own
process. The force and deference of arbitration clauses have improved since
arbitration has risen to prominence, upheld even in the face of allegations of
fraud or illegality. 136 The purpose for safeguarding tailored arbitration
clauses is to promote the freedom of parties to contract and to protect the
agreements that they make, but for the system to be able to handle and
process the “wide range of business disputes, including many large, complex
cases, arbitration procedures have tended to become longer and more
detailed.” 137 Thus, the goal of providing flexibility to arbitrating parties by
allowing them to devise their own procedures and choose their own forum
has in fact led to stronger and more varied regulations that have taken away
this flexibility.
The increasingly formality and rule-oriented nature of arbitration has
forced parties to seek alternative courses, still within arbitration but by
navigating around the rules. By drafting international agreements “with
greater precision and . . . intentionally choosing what law they want to
govern interpretation and enforcement of their agreement,” parties avoid the

arbitration award through a specific provision. Id. This provision will ideally state the level of
finality that the parties expect from the award, and in what circumstances it can be appealed. Id. “If
the parties constrain the arbitrators’ authority by requiring a dispute to be decided according to the
rule of law, and make plain their intention that the award is reviewable for legal error, the general
rule of limited review has been displaced by the parties’ agreement.” Id.
133. Though the California Supreme Court had the authority to uphold judicial review
provisions in Cable Connections for state arbitrations falling under its jurisdiction, the federal courts
incorporated the more stringent New York Convention requirements for judicial review in the
Federal Arbitration Act. For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that arbitrators do not “‘exceed
their powers’ . . . when they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly;” rather, there
must be a “manifest disregard of law” or an irrational decision for the courts to even consider
reviewing the award. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997
(9th Cir. 2003). Considering the standard that appellate courts use to review lower court decisions,
arbitral awards tend to receive far more deference than the opinions of federal judges.
134. While flexibility is important to preserve arbitration as a process, judicial review
provisions create too many difficulties for users, according to Professor Stipanowich. Business users
in particular should look to the grounds of vacatur in the Federal Arbitration Act for relief if
necessary; if more options are desired, a carefully written appellate arbitration procedure can be
adopted in the contract. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 49. See also PROTOCOLS, supra note 69,
at 38-42.
135. Dunham, supra note 129, at 328.
136. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 10.
137. Id. at 11.
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involvement of intervening substantive law that would otherwise fill the
gaps.138 Still, it is unfortunate for parties to have to evade a process that was
designed to maximize the efficiency of the resolution of their disputes
simply because it became too entangled in its own technicalities.139
PART III
A. Mediation: The New Alternative to Arbitration
Despite the mounting concern over the effectiveness and longevity of
arbitration, it remains certain that most countries still prefer alternative
dispute resolution processes to the rigors of litigation. 140 “Many nations are
disenchanted with litigation . . . because of the significant problems
surrounding the recognition and enforcement of litigated judgments. In
addition, many nations generally mistrust the supposed neutrality of foreign
legal systems.”141 Arbitration was a natural successor to this dying system,
but now suffers from its own impracticalities, including, as noted, a
perceived American influence, more centralized national governance, and
increased arbitral institutional regulation. 142 Though arbitration was once
the favored alternative dispute resolution because of its predictable
enforcement practices,143 for some scholars, the next logical step is to
“‘make greater use of conciliation [mediation] as a pathway to the settlement

138. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 66-67.
139. While it may seem that arbitration is essentially shooting itself in the foot with its
overregulation, it should be noted that there are certain parties practicing arbitration who welcome
the strict structure that has been created by the institutions. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at
408 (“To the extent that ADR has become institutionalized and more routine, it is now practiced by
many different people, pursuing many different goals.”).
140. Julie Barker, International Mediation—A Better Alternative for the Resolution of
Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International Commercial
Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1996).
141. Id. at 5.
142. In addition to the downfalls of international commercial arbitration that were the focus of
the preceding section, some other problems that have contributed to decreasing popularity are:
involvement of multiple national legal systems; expensive, lengthy, adversarial, adjudicative-type
procedures; uncontrolled result; and limited appellate review. Id. at 7.
143. Steele, supra note 19, at 1385.
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of economic and business disputes, rather than automatically taking the more
complex arbitration route to dispute settlement.’”144
Mediation is often viewed as a more conciliatory method by which to
resolve a dispute145 as compared to arbitration because its key purpose is to
facilitate an agreement between the parties146 rather than to impose one.147
As a result, there is no guarantee of an outcome, 148 but those that are forged
are thought to be more satisfying for the parties, particularly as mediation is
designed to address the “non-arbitrable” issues such as “intangible feelings,
personal interests, and emotional concerns.”149 Thus, one of the most lauded
benefits of mediation is the preservation of the business relationships in
which the parties were engaged before the dispute arose. 150
B. Exploring the “Unique Benefits” of Mediation
To evaluate whether mediation is truly an effective way to circumvent
arbitration and litigation, the merits of the processes should be directly
compared. Three of mediation’s most boastful characteristics are: the
potential creativity of the outcomes; the informality of the proceedings,
leading to a faster and cheaper result; and the ability of the parties to discuss
their positions so that they feel that their views have been considered. 151 To
assume, however, that none of these features could be achieved in arbitration
is to ignore one of arbitration’s fundamental premises – its flexibility.
Arbitrators can be creative with their awards so long as they do not overstep

144. Barker, supra note 140, at 8 (quoting Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the
Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’ L L.J. 578, 580-81
(1990-1991)).
145. See Int’l Chamber of Commerce, 2009 Statistical Report, DISPUTE RESOLUTION LIBRARY
(2009), available at http://www.iccdrl.com [hereinafter Statistical Report]. Mediation is one of the
International Chamber of Commerce’s token ADR processes; appropriately, the ICC’s version of
ADR stands for “Amicable Dispute Resolution,” rather than the traditional American “Alternative
Dispute Resolution.” Id. Perhaps most significantly, the ICC does not include arbitration in its
classification of ADR as America includes it in its own version. This rather telling difference
demonstrates the global disillusionment with arbitration as a non-adversarial process, though it is
still often perceived as such in the U.S. as compared with the vicious American litigation system.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Mediation has been an important technique for centuries. Abraham Lincoln used a key
neutral tactic to learn the true interests of a slandered client in order to win her an apology and save
the opponent from bankruptcy. Lincoln’s Lessons, supra note 2, at 19-20.
148. Barker, supra note 140, at 10.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 9.
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the bounds of their discretion. 152 Additionally, as arbitration is a creature of
contract,153 the parties have the choice of how formal the proceedings will
be, including the possibilities of making their own presentations to the
arbitrators to ensure that their feelings are considered.
Other “distinct” attributes of mediation are its wide application to any
kind of conflict and the confidentiality of the process. 154 Arbitration,
though, has never been limited to a particular type of field, and also assures
its users of the utmost confidentiality. 155 Thus, the purported advantages of
mediation over arbitration are actually common to both processes because of
their comparable flexibility that can be found in alternative dispute
resolution techniques.
While mediation shares many of its qualities with arbitration and other
ADR processes, it still retains a personality of its own. Its advocates tout the
absence of a binding decision, the ability to solve deeper, relational issues,
and increased cultural sensitivity. 156 Though these may be valuable
considerations in circumstances where the parties are willing to take the time

152. Steele, supra note 19, at 1393. According to Article V(1) of the New York Convention,
arbitration awards may be unenforceable if “(c) the arbitrator acted outside his authority.” Id. They
may similarly be invalid if “[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.” Id. Though written in broad terms, these provisions are construed
rather narrowly to give arbitrators broad discretion in making their awards. Id. at 1394. Rather, the
most important limitation on arbitration awards that must be recognized is the scope of the
arbitrator’s authority, delineated by the contractual terms. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note
20, at 107.
An arbitration agreement confers a mandate upon an arbitral tribunal to decide any and
all of the disputes that come within the ambit of that agreement. It is important that an
arbitrator not go beyond this mandate. If he does, there is a risk that his award will be
refused recognition and enforcement under the provisions of the New York Convention.
Article V(1)(c) provides that recognition and enforcement may be refused: “If the award
deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to the arbitration, or if it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration.”
Id. The same restriction on scope similarly applies to mediation as a fellow contractual delineation.
153. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
154. Barker, supra note 140, at 9.
155. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 4.
156. See generally Barker, supra note 140. The author discusses benefits of mediation like
control over process and outcome, but without considering that with the control comes the obligation
to agree on how to control these aspects to make mediation viable. Considering the complexity of
party interaction on the international level generally, it is questionable as to whether this approach
would be preferable.
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to engage in such therapeutic tactics, these practices are not appropriate in
the international commercial setting. Where a commercial agreement is at
stake in today’s fast-paced business world, an assured outcome is crucial,
which is one reason to value arbitration. 157 And although it would be ideal
to preserve a good business relationship where one exists, this is not always
the case, making the outcome of the dispute the most important focus, not
the parties’ personal issues; regardless, with the plethora of commercial
options that exist globally, the time sacrificed hashing out individual
differences is usually ill-spent.158 Finally, cultural sensitivity is very
important on the international level, but those who wish to put mediation at
the forefront of global ADR ignore the possibility that arbitration could
incorporate this beneficial technique. By encouraging arbitration institutions
to train their arbitrators to respond to ideological differences, arbitration
could take a page from mediation’s book in making itself a more viable
process.
C. The Practicality of Mediation as the New Arbitration
Because of the early prominence of arbitration in the international field,
it has gained more deference than mediation amongst countries that
recognize its usefulness. The New York Convention provides that its
signatories uphold foreign arbitration awards without judicial review, except
under a limited set of circumstances. 159 As a result, the treaty “plays a vital
role in the predictability of international business” because it gives a set of
guidelines that have led the way for precedential decisions on which
arbitrators can rely for consistency in their opinions. 160 Additionally, the
Convention only recognizes those awards that are “binding” on the parties to
157. “Even if mediation does not lead to a resolution, the parties are no worse off because they
may still take advantage of arbitration or litigation.” Barker, supra note 140, at 10. This assessment
is overly optimistic because it ignores the potentially disastrous consequences that delays can have in
the commercial world. The time taken to engage in a good-faith effort to mediate could cost a
company significantly more than is worth the questionable outcome of the attempt. Additionally, at
this point in the conflict, it is probable that the parties have engaged in negotiations to resolve the
issue amicably, likely with the help of sophisticated counsel, which makes successful mediation
even less likely.
158. Though preservation of party relationships is usually not a prioritized practice of
arbitration and is generally seen as a key benefit of mediation, there are arbitral techniques that focus
on future contracts. For example, interest arbitrators are “expected . . . to devise the actual contract
provisions that will bind the parties during a future term.” Rau, supra note 81, at 473. This type of
arbitration, however, is generally not chosen in the international commercial context because the
resulting contractual relationship is usually not as important as the resolution of the immediate issue.
Id.
159. Steele, supra note 19, at 1393.
160. Id. at 1394.
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it, excluding, for the most part, mediation agreements, unless they have been
Because mediation is classified as a
approved by a court.161
“noncompulsory process,” even the clauses that commit parties to its
procedures are given less force than arbitration clauses. 162
Though mediation has not overtaken arbitration in the way that
arbitration replaced litigation, 163 its value is not unknown. “Increasing
academic and professional interest in other ADR methods is, to a great
extent, a reaction to arbitration’s deteriorating technical advantages, since
161. Id. There has been much debate over the meaning of “binding” and whether it can be
extended to mediation agreements interpreted as contracts, though international legal trends suggest
that the Convention should be limited solely to arbitral awards. Id. at 1396-97. Though it would be
ideal to assume that as voluntary settlements, mediation agreements would be voluntarily carried
out, the failure to establish an enforcement mechanism would be naïve and ignorant of the realities
that often follow amicable resolutions. Id. at 1387.
162. Id. at 1399. Regarding the comparatively voluntary nature of arbitration and mediation,
“[b]oth arbitration and mediation require consent to initiate the process, but mediation participants
retain the right to terminate the process at any time. Once parties initiate arbitration, they are bound
by the arbitrator’s decision.” Id. at 1399 n.87 (citing Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for
Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 589
(2005)).
Mediation is a fundamentally different process than arbitration. . . . The decision of
whether to settle and on what terms is left to the parties. Mediation convening and due
process standards are unique because the mediator does not bear binding decision
authority. Since agreement is made by consent, parties are generally free to create value
with their settlement-for example, by developing new business relationships that were not
originally contemplated.
Steele, supra note 19, at 1399. See also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 20, at 341 (“An
arbitral tribunal may only validly resolve those disputes that the parties have agreed that it should
resolve. This rule is an inevitable and proper consequence of the voluntary nature of arbitration. In
consensual arbitration, the authority or competence of the arbitral tribunal comes from the agreement
of the parties; indeed, there is no other source from which it can come.”). This is a reflection of the
principle that alternative dispute resolution methods are primarily creatures of contract and only
extend as far as the parties have consented by agreement. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 47.
163. Though the number of cases filed for ADR with the ICC doubled in 2009 as compared to
the past seven years (90% of which were referred to mediation), the total came to twenty-four
compared to the record 817 arbitration cases filed. Statistical Report, supra note 146. While the
number of ADR cases has been steadily rising, so has the number of arbitration cases, indicating the
tenacious hold that arbitration retains in the world of international disputes. Unlike litigation, it
appears that its influence is unlikely to fade in the near future. But see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,
Mediation: The “New Arbitration” (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1713928),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713928&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=1713928 (suggesting that arbitration’s popularity is decreasing in favor of
mediation).
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the institution can no longer be indisputably regarded as the cheap,
expeditious, and informal mechanism it was once advertised to be.”164
Arbitration is being substantially changed by mediation; with more
mediation hearings before arbitration, cases are increasingly settled, which
reduces the need for arbitration.165
With mediation as a rising dispute resolution trend, however, the
concern is for it to truly follow the path of arbitration, and to lose its
effectiveness in the quagmire of misuse and overregulation. 166 The natural
tendency for legal procedures is for them to become rigid and reflexive
because lawyers are formal and process-oriented, and as processes grow,
they change.167 While this change may not be deliberate, it comes with the
experience of using mediation, and does not necessarily have to have a
negative effect. 168 Arbitration has evolved to be the method it is today, and
though it is no longer as fast as it once was, it is not necessarily less
efficient,169 and may even afford greater justice because of the increased
attention to procedural and substantive fairness. Thus, mediation will evolve
into its role as it rises as a choice for the resolution of international
commercial disputes.
The key issue with the contention between mediation and arbitration is
that their respective supporters tend to see them as mutually exclusive
instead of being more or less appropriate in particular types of situations.170
Rather than sharing the spotlight, they are viewed as competitors for the

164. Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under
the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. I NT’ L L.J. 419, 438 (2000).
165. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
166. There are two uses for arbitration that Shalakany denotes in his commentary: technical and
political. Shalakany, supra note 164, at 434. Though he readily admits that the technical uses for
arbitration have significantly devolved, he cautions the reader against underestimating the lasting
political effects of arbitration. Id.
[A]rbitration’s political advantages . . . are yet intact and growing all the more
indispensable with the current surge of foreign investments in emerging markets. The
most serious residual advantages of arbitration thus appear to be political, chief among
which is arbitration’s ability to offer a legitimating medium for the effective
disempowerment of national legislative potentials.
Id. “However, ADR advocates usually disregard arbitration’s political advantages—advantages that
both comprise and far surpass those of alternative ADR mechanisms.” Id. at 438.
167. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Barker, supra note 139, at 8 (supporting an in-text quote by a Canadian law professor
who stated that mediation is the way for international commercial disputes).
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vacancy that litigation left when it was pushed aside in favor of ADR
methods.
CONCLUSION
From its very beginnings, arbitration has been developed to serve the
noble cause of keeping peace between international parties. Though the
nature of these conflicts has evolved significantly, the practice is still in use,
and has risen to a position of international notoriety for its famed cheaper,
faster, and more effective and final results. With arbitration’s more
widespread use, however, the need to adapt its benefits to more kinds of
conflicts has converted these benefits into detriments that are deplored by
champions of other forms of dispute resolution.
The start of international commercial arbitration can be found in
Western Europe, which practices primarily civil law techniques. With the
increased economic interaction between countries, disputes began to arise,
and the impracticalities of global litigation were quickly revealed. The key
problems—impracticality of enforcement, long duration, legal and cultural
barriers, amongst others—saw a solution with arbitration, and it was
developed through the attention of arbitral institutions and international
treaties.
The ratification of the New York Convention by the United States led to
an increase in American involvement, which subsequently led to accusations
of “Americanization” of the international commercial arbitration system.
Though admittedly U.S. litigation techniques have found their way into
arbitration practices, the fact that they are retained suggests that they have
had a more positive influence than not.
That arbitration proceedings are becoming lengthier, more expensive,
and more varied throughout the world has been credited to involvement by
U.S. attorneys. To assert, however, that U.S. participation has singlehandedly destroyed the effectiveness of arbitration is irresponsible,
especially given the positive impact that it has had on the two techniques
discussed; this connection even proposes the idea that if any positive
changes are to come to international commercial arbitration, perhaps they
should come from the United States.
Other factors must be taken into consideration as well, and the rise of
nationalization and overregulation of arbitration proceedings are more likely
to be the culprits. Government-led companies are susceptible to more
claims than those that are privately owned, and so are more likely to try to
tweak proceedings to protect themselves at the expense of their efficiency.
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Additionally, the application of arbitration to a wider variety of disputes
requires more specific, stringent rules, which by their very nature deprive
parties of the ability to manipulate the process.
With its notable success and domestic popularity in many countries,
including the United States, arbitration will not likely be ruled obsolete, at
least in the near future. However, its benefits in the international arena are
quickly eroding, making way for other types of dispute resolution to replace
it as it replaced litigation. It is important to recognize the fate of
international commercial arbitration, if not to revive it, then to prevent the
same deterioration of its potential successor.
Mediation has attempted to rise to the position of that successor,
claiming superficially distinguishing characteristics that are actually inherent
to the flexibility of arbitration. With its increasing attention, however,
mediation runs the risk of falling victim to its own advantages of which
arbitration has been found guilty.
Rather than try to replace arbitration, mediation should fall into its own
niche, and the value of each should be recognized for its potential. For all of
the pros and cons of the processes, arbitration is ultimately most valuable for
resolving conflicts that are time-sensitive and often routine. Mediation, on
the other hand, is beneficial in situations where relationships need to be
preserved, the disputes are less pressing, and the outcome should be more
careful and detailed in its treatment of each party. Thus, each of the
procedures is appropriate in its own context, which shifts the responsibility
to the legal community to determine what the parties’ interests are and
which method is more appropriate for the situation.
Creation through contract, using this system of assigning arbitration and
mediation, would still be effective; clauses could simply state that matters
pertaining directly to the terms of the original contract would be resolved
through arbitration, while other disputes, such as future contracts or
subsequent negotiations, could be referred to mediation.
Arbitration is already beginning to show signs of wear and tear from
misuse because it is being overly employed in too many inappropriate
situations. The key to preserving ADR processes is to use them properly, as
the rules governing each are designed to apply to the types of conflicts for
which they are designed. The beauty of their flexibility is that if there does
need to be a change made, it can be so done without detrimentally affecting
the process. The carelessness with which arbitration has been treated as it
has been flung into every conceivable contract has deteriorated the process.
By realizing this problem, the legal community can take a proactive
approach to prevent the successive decline of every ADR process when it is
brought in to replace the previous technique, starting with the prevention of
arbitration from going the way of the Greeks.
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